Page 80 - GSA Annual Report / Jaarverslag 2013

Markoorsig vir grane en oliesade
Market overview for grains and oilseeds 78
Trade and trade policy environment (continued)
Cape wheat location differentials
The straining impact of the location differentials on the full development of the free cash market in the
Western Cape Province is not acceptable. The differentials are a non-statutory announced intervention by
the JSE supported by stakeholders in the industry without consensus by all stakeholders in the industry.
Producers are opposed to the differential system while other role-players in the market seem to be
unaffected and indifferent by the impact that the discontinuation or continuation of the differential system
will have on their own businesses. However, these influential members of the supply chain still reserve the
unqualified position to take authorisation on the concern of producers, while the latter chose to accept the
possibility of any downside risk and lack of information on supportive basis history. The differential system,
as practised by the JSE, impacts negatively on the full development of the free market (physical – forward
and cash market) and also limits competition and price discovery. It is expected that the proposal by wheat
producers in the Western Cape, if accepted, will increase the liquidity of the Cape wheat contract and its
overall usage as a price risk management tool. The free market environment will introduce necessary
market mechanisms to improve the transparency of forward and cash market prices and transport costs.
At the end of 2013 the JSE decided that it could not continue with the proposal of Grain SA to do away
with the location differentials.
Cape wheat producers trading on Safex
When the Safex agricultural futures division was formed, participation by producers on the exchange
was essential for its long-term success and participation by producers back then was notable. However,
fifteen years later, it was noted that this was no longer the case and the number of Western Cape
wheat producers trading directly on Safex in some areas varies between 37% to 50%, but on average
it declined to 10% to 20%. Of the producers who initially had Safex accounts, 91% of them stopped
trading completely. The major reasons that attributed to the decrease on Safex trading were the
cashflow requirements, as well as the notion that producers could achieve the same benefits and even
more through the services offered by the grain traders and agribusinesses.
Handels- en handelsbeleidomgewing (vervolg)
Kaapse koringliggingsdifferensiale
Die stremmende impak van die liggingsdifferensiale op die volle ontwikkeling van die vrye kontantmark
in die Wes-Kaap Provinsie is nie aanvaarbaar nie. Die differensiale is ‘n niestatutêre intervensie wat
deur die JSE aangekondig word en deur belanghebbendes in die bedryf gesteun word, sonder dat daar
konsensus onder alle belanghebbendes in die bedryf is. Produsente is gekant teen die differensiaalstelsel,
terwyl ander rolspelers in die mark blykbaar nie geraak word nie en onverskillig staan teenoor die impak
wat die staking of voortsetting van die differensiaalstelsel op hulle eie ondernemings sal hê. Hierdie
invloedryke lede van die aanbodketting handhaaf egter steeds die ongekwalifiseerde standpunt om
die kommer van produsente te ignoreer, terwyl laasgenoemde verkies om die moontlikheid van enige
negatiewe risiko en ‘n gebrek aan inligting wat op 'n stawende geskiedkundige grondslag gebaseer is,
te aanvaar. Die differensiaalstelsel, soos dit deur die JSE toegepas word, het ‘n negatiewe impak op die
volle ontwikkeling van die vrye mark (fisies – toekomstige en kontantmark) en beperk ook mededinging
en prysbepaling. Daar word verwag dat, indien die voorstel deur koringprodusente in die Wes-Kaap
aanvaar word, dit die likiditeit van die Kaapse koringkontrak en die oorkoepelende gebruik daarvan as ‘n
prysrisikobetuursinstrument sal verhoog. Die vryemarkomgewing sal die nodige markmeganismes instel
om die deursigtigheid van toekomstige en kontantmarkpryse en vervoerkoste te verbeter.
Die JSE het teen einde 2013 besluit dat daar nie met Graan SA se voorstel om met die
liggingsdifferensiale weg te doen, voortgegaan kan word nie.
Kaapse koringprodusente wat op Safex verhandel
Toe die Safex-landboutermynkontrakte-afdeling gestig is, was deelname deur produsente op die beurs
noodsaaklik vir die langtermynsukses daarvan en deelname deur produsente op daardie stadium was
merkwaardig. Vyftien jaar later word daar egter gemerk dat dit nie die meer die geval is nie en die getal Wes-
Kaapse koringprodusente wat direk op Safex verhandel, wissel in sommige gebiede tussen 37% en 50%. Dit
het gemiddeld egter tot 10% of 20% gedaal. Onder die produsente wat aanvanklik Safex-rekeninge gehad
het, het 91% heeltemal opgehou verhandel. Die vernaamste redes wat tot die afname in Safex-verhandeling
gelei het, was die kontantvloeivereistes asook die gedagte dat produsente dieselfde voordele en selfs meer
kon bereik deur die dienste wat deur die graanhandelaars en landbou-ondernemings verskaf word.
Die JSE het teen
einde 2013 besluit
dat daar nie met
Graan SA se
voorstel om met die
liggingsdifferensiale
weg te doen,
voortgegaan kan
word nie.